The conviction is growing among observers of world affairs that the centre of gravity has now moved to the Pacific. If this is so, then the future of civilization may be determined, largely, by the outcome of the China problem.
Hence the importance of our subject - Britain's China Policy. To be more precise, we should say the China Policy of the United Kingdom as formulated at and directed from London. It is necessary to note this for the China Policy of the United Kingdom differs in some vital respects from that of such Commonwealth countries as Australia and New Zealand.
This policy must not be confused with the splendid service rendered China by individuals such as Sir Thomas Wade, Sir Robert Hart and others. The former of these will always deserve a place in history for his epoch-making romanization of the Chinese written characters, a system which, after many years, has not been superseded. The work of Sir Robert Hart in training Chinese Customs officials, though perhaps less widely known and less spectacular, was, nevertheless, a unique contribution to Chinese progress. In their official capacities, these men and others who deserve honorable mention, were the loyal servants of their Government in London, although it is a matter of history that often they differed from London on matters of policy. Then, on the lower official level, the names of such as Consul Meadows and others who followed him must not be forgotten. These men carried out the orders of their superiors in Peking, which were not always in accord with their own convictions. History has recorded, for instance, that Consul Meadows, who functioned at Shanghai during one of the most critical periods in the history of modern China, strongly disapproved of the official policy. Also, we must not conclude that British official policy on China is an expression of popular opinion. There never has been in Britain what could be called a popular mind on the China problem. Indeed, little serious thought has ever been given by the people to this issue, which they regard as too remote.
Our present study, however, is not concerned with such matters but rather with the policy officially set down in London and carried out by British representatives in China. How vastly different this policy might have been, during the past century, if more attention had been paid to the views of officials on the spot, lies outside the scope of our enquiry but it certainly remains a most inviting field for the play of the imagination.
At the outset, then, it must be noted that British foreign policy is unique in one particular. It has always been characterized by a certain constancy. Changes of Government have not been followed by violent changes in foreign policy and each administration has, in the main, continued the line taken by its predecessor. There have been occasions when the majority of the Commons has objected to a certain policy but the Government has carried it out and the majority opposition has acquiesced in it. For example, there was the 'Arrow' incident of 1856. A craft, owned by Chinese, with a Chinese crew, but registered in Hongkong, and having a British captain and flying the British flag, was boarded by Chinese officials at Canton, who arrested the crew on the ground that they had been engaged in a recent act of piracy. The British flag was hauled down. On the ground that British sovereignty had been violated and the Chinese had refused to give the satisfaction demanded, Britain opened hostilities and bombarded Canton. In the Commons, Richard Cobden moved a vote of no-confidence in the Palmerston Government. Gladstone supported the motion, which was carried by a majority of sixteen. The Prime Minister replied to this censure motion by stating that "there cannot be any change in the policy towards China". The war against China went on and that country was beaten to its knees and had to pay dearly for its defeat.
But other Commonwealth countries do not follow Britain in this practice of constancy. In both Australia and New Zealand, to mention two of these, the present official policy is recognition of the Chinese Nationalist Government, but the Labour Party has called for recognition of the Peking Communist Government and has made it clear in both countries that when returned to power, this policy will be carried out. Constancy in foreign policy, then, is peculiar to the United Kingdom.
In order, then, to understand Britain's China Policy, it will be necessary to survey history and discover, if possible, any permanent features in the official attitude, which can be regarded as constituting a definite policy. We propose to survey the history of China during the past 100 years as this period marks the era of China's awakening. The words of Matthew Arnold:
'The East bow'd low before the blast
In patient, deep disdain.
She let the legions thunder past,
And plunged in thought again'
cannot be applied to China during this period, for China neither 'bow'd low' nor 'plunged in thought again', but, on the contrary, her head was 'bloody but unbow'd'.
We invited you, then, to consider the following:
(1) A survey of British actions in China during the past century.
(2) The presence of such constant features as constitute a policy.
(3) An appraisal of such policy.
1. We begin with a survey of British official actions in China over the past 100 years. It would not be possible to note each of these but we select the three great crises; the T'ai P'ing Rebellion, the Revolution that resulted in the establishment of the Republic, and the inauguration of the rival administrations in Peking and Taipei. Most sinologues will agree, we believe, that these were the outstanding events in China during the period under review.
(a) Take the first of these, the T'ai P'ing Rebellion, led by the Hakka Hung Hsiu-ch'uan. Hung was born in the year 1813 in a small village about 30 miles from Canton. The Manchu regime, set up two centuries earlier by the psychopathic Shun Chih was in its decline. The sun that had shone brilliantly in the days of K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung was now rapidly westering. The long day of the Ch'ings threatened to end in the darkest of nights, with little promise of another morning. Such lights as were seen on the distant hills were but the hectic glow of that expiring life, coronals of an evanescent splendour. Rarely in the long Chinese story had there been such stark poverty. When wars had ravaged the country, the population had been so decimated that there was land enough for those who survived, but since 1720 the conflicts had been confined to border conflicts that hardly touched the lives of the people. Result was that from 1754 till 1814 the population had risen from 185 to 375 millions. There were too many mouths to be fen off the available land. The avarice of landlords and the corruption of officials combined to aggravate the nation-wide distress. And beneath it all was the widespread conviction that the Manchus in Peking were so weak and so corrupt that any foreign Power found it easy to impose its will on the country.
Such was the China in which Hung Hsiu-ch'uan was born. As a boy he showed such promise that the family denied itself the few comforts their fields provided, in order that he should remain at the village school till he was 16 years of age. He then secured a position as junior teacher in the village school. On one of his frequent visits to Canton he heard a German missionary, Gutzlaff, reading the Ten Commandments, to a street crowd. Hung was so interested that he obtained some Christian tracts from Leang, the missionary's interpreter. These he took home with him to read and study. Result was that he fashioned in his mind a concept of Christianity against a Buddhist-Confucian background. When, in 1837, he failed to qualify at the provincial examinations, he seems to have passed through a strange illness, in which he claimed to have had a series of visions. Together with several companions, to whom he had expounded his idea of Christianity, he set out to convert the surrounding villagers and had such success that, in a short time, he had established "The Society of God-Worshippers". In each centre a church was built. In 1846 he was again in Canton where he made his first and only personal contact with a Western Christian, the American Missionary. I. J. Roberts. This lack of contact with missionaries might explain many of his strange ideas of Christianity. Still, these can be understood if examined against the background of Chinese custom and family tradition. Professor E. R. Hughes of Oxford has remarked that "this Taiping movement would appear to be exactly what is meant by indigenisation; namely, a wholly spontaneous response coming from the depths of a man's soul and containing native elements of thought, which the man has instinctively incorporated with the new message".
In 1849 the movement, which, hitherto, had been purely religious in character, assumed political significance, owing to the edict from Peking that it had to be suppressed. From that time, Hung became obsessed with the idea that he was divinely commissioned to drive the Manchus out of China and establish the T'ai P'ing or Great Heavenly Dynasty. With 100,000 followers, singing hymns and wearing Ming robes, Hung marched towards Nanking. On March 8, 1851, he entered Nanking, which remained his capital for the next 13 years. It is interesting to note that while the T'ai P'ing host was entering Nanking, to the north in Peking, the very dissolute Emperor, Hsien Feng, although only twenty years of age, was busy in the Palace of Feminine Repose, inspecting the bevy of beauties from which he was to replenish his harem for the coming year. However, at the close of 1863, the Chinese Imperial forces entered Nanking, after Major Charles Gordon, loaned to. Peking by the British Government, had, at the head of the "Ever Victorious Army" smashed T'ai P'ing resistance from Shanghai to the gates of Nanking.
Just here it will be of interest to note the observations of two Britishers who were on the spot in China. A. F. Lindley, who fought with the T'ai P'ing armies and later moved about the court of Hung published in 1866 his 'Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh'. In it we read the following:
"The Ti-Pings have abolished the horrible custom of cramping the feet of the women. Slavery no longer exists. The Ti-Pings have already achieved an important moral revolution, which is proving to be a national deliverance. The moral regeneration is already visible. Everywhere the Ten Commandments are to be seen on tablets. There is at least one in every home. Opium has been strictly prohibited, also tobacco. The sabbath is observed with the utmost care and all through the kingdom, the churches are filled on that day. A torch has, at last, been lit in Asia, which marks the dawn of Christianity".
Some years earlier, in 1854, the Anglican Bishop of HongKong described the movement in these words:
"The finger of Divine Providence appears to us signally conspicuous in this revolution. The moral, social, and political condition of China was almost hopelessly wretched and debased. Its whole system of government and society was to be renewed. In looking about for an agency available for such an end, the mind was depressed and perplexed. The whole nation seemed bound, hand and foot. Their moral energies were paralysed, their intellectual faculties were stunted, and their civil liberties were crushed beneath the iron grip of power. Political subjection to an effete despotism and addiction to opium had enervated the national mind. In this state of perplexity and despondency, we survey this present movement and beholding it, we admire it and thank God for what our eyes are now privileged to behold".
It has been customary to brand the T'ai P'ing leader as a brutal fanatic, whose one and only ambition was to wade through slaughter to a throne. That there were fanaticism and cruelty, there can be no doubt. But these were not all. And, in recent years, both Chinese and Western scholars have been making an intensive study of both the leader and the movement. Their researches suggest that some new appraisal is now called for. Let me quote from several of these investigations. Professor E. R. Hughes in his "The Invasion of China by the Western World" sums up his estimate of the movement in these words:
'One cannot but deplore the failure of a movement, which, with better guidance, might have proved to be the real thing and have established an empire in China, which would have been, at least, as Christian as that of Constantine'.
Professor Claude Buss of Stanford in his "The Far East" expresses the view that the T'ai P'ing rebellion was 'a social and economic revolt, which involved an uprising of peasants, rural proletariat, hand workers and poorer gentry. They argued for higher living standards for the poverty-stricken'.
These interpretations are in line with those offered by Chinese scholars who have studied the available material. Tang Leang-li, in his "China in Revolt" maintains that 'Hung Hsiu-ch'uan aimed at the establishment of a new social order'. Other Chinese scholars have pointed out that agrarian reform occupied the leading place in the Tai P'ing reforms and one Chinese scholar has suggested that it was these land reforms rather than any religious appeal that attracted many to the movement. All agree that the Nanking Administration was reasonably clean and corruption among officials at a minimum. Certainly a striking contrast to the conditions prevailing at Peking.
What, then, was the official British attitude to the T'ai P'ings? We have mentioned already that Charles Gordon delivered the military blow that destroyed the regime, but for what reason? We are not left in any doubt as to the answer as it has been given in the clearest of words in Hansard. In 1864 discussion in the Commons was intense on this China question and public opinion was rising against the Government. Prime Minister Palmerston stated the Government position thus:
'It was in the interest of England that the rebellion should cease and that the authority of the Imperial Government should be re-established and maintained in China. It was with that object that permission had been given to Captain Osborn and Mr. Lay to organise a naval force for the purpose of co-operating with the Imperial troops. An Order-in-Council had been passed, permitting British subjects generally to enter the service of the Chinese Government'.
But this did not satisfy many in the Commons. One of these, Mr. Baxter, asked the Prime Minister: "Does the Government, in future, mean to adhere, strictly and honourably, to the defense of British property in the treaty ports, refusing all kind of aid, directly or indirectly, to the Imperialists and abandoning the attempt to bolster up and support the Peking Government?" To this question Lord Palmerston came right out into the open and stated British policy. He said: 'Our reason for interfering in the affairs of China was that our treaty rights were endangered and our national interests at stake'. Then, after a pause, he added: 'Any measure to increase the commercial relations of the country is deserving of praise'.
However, this was not the end. Later, the question was raised again and Colonel Sykes closed the debate with these significant words:
'British bayonets and British shot and shell, in violation of good faith and in violation of a commanded neutrality, have aided a Government, which has been characterised for its constant perfidy and cruelty, to defeat a national party, in which, as we see, was not only a germ of Christianity, of probable development into a rich harvest, but which party also had manifested a desire to cultivate friendly relations with foreigners, with a view to the introduction of Western science and art, as distinguished from the Imperial Government, which stupidly opposes every proposition for the establishment of railways, telegraphs and other useful objects'.
Evidently Prime Minister Palmerston had in mind the treaties of 1842 and 1844 which Britain had forced on a defeated China and which opened five Chinese ports to British trade and ceded Hongkong to Britain together with a large indemnity. The T'ai P'ings, whilst quite willing to enter into friendly relations with any foreign country, were, nevertheless, determined to demand what they considered to be China's inalienable rights.
However, there was one British official in China who disapproved of his Government's actions. He had accompanied the British Admiral when he visited the T'ai P'ings at Nanking and acted as interpreter. He had walked through the streets and talked with both officials and people. He had attended the T'ai P'ing religious services. Here are his words, written at the time, and to-day, after 100 years, how prophetic they sound:
'If the T'ai P'ings succeed, let the three maritime Powers, on the one hand keep Russia off, and, on the other hand, overcome the absurd T'ai P'ing pretensions to universal supremacy and their other obstructive notions, by due use of conciliatory reasoning, of forbearance, of firmness, and, if necessary, of military force. Let this be done till T'aipingism is fairly established for a generation and then the rest of the world may confidently trust to the Chinese forming one of the most insuperable barriers to the Peter-Catherine policy of aggression and the Russian aims at universal dominion'.
T. T. Meadows was not alone in this view of the T'ai P'ings. The words of the American Commissioner in Shanghai, Humphrey Marshall, suggest that he too could see danger ahead. In his official report at the time we find this:
'I think that almost any sacrifice should be made by the United States to keep Russia from spreading her Pacific boundary and to avoid her coming directly to interfere in Chinese domestic affairs".
However, the British Government in London had marked out its course and was determined to pursue it at all and any costs. Prime Minister Palmerston had boasted that 'England is strong enough to brave any consequences' and as a result the advice of an official on the spot in China was of little account.
(b) We come now to the second crisis, the revolution which resulted in the establishment of the Republic in 1911. The central figure of that period was Sun Yat-sen, whose career is so well known that it is not necessary to detail it. However, there were two sources of Sun's inspiration that most of his biographers have overlooked or ignored. We refer to the influence upon his thinking of the T'ai P'ing leader, and his visit to Formosa in 1897.
(1) Let us look briefly at these. The Chinese historian Tsui Chi tells of that "old man, to whose stories Sun Tai-cheong (milk name of Sun) would listen with shining eyes, who was a veteran of the T'ai P'ing Rebellion. He would relate, over and over again, the fascinating story of that daring revolt against the Manchu ruler, which had ended just three years before Sun's birth". In later years, Sun Yat-sen often referred to those stories that had charmed his boyhood mind. He admitted the causes of the T'ai P'ing's failure but never ceased to admire its leader. One teahouse in Choyhung village he held in dearest memory. As a boy, he used to slip in among the farmers as they talked of their crops and discussed prices, while they sipped tea and recounted their personal experiences and how they had escaped the swords of the avenging Imperial troops. It is highly significant that on February 12, 1912, the day on which the Manchu Emperor abdicated, Sun Yat-sen and his ministers made their pilgrimage to the tomb of Tai Tsu, founder of Ming dynasty, and after the prayer of thanksgiving to the spirit of the great Ming, Sun delivered an oration in which he paid tribute to Hung Hsiu-ch'uan and his contribution to the revolution.
(2) Sun's visit to Formosa in 1897 was, possibly, the most significant event in his pre-Revolution career. He went there a depressed and disappointed man. It might well be said that it was in Formosa he faced the most intense spiritual crisis of his life. Country after country had closed its doors to him but in Formosa he was among his own people although the Japanese were the rulers of the island. It was at Tainan in Formosa that Cheng Chen-kung (known to the West as Koxinga) of Fukien Province had planned, in the 17th century, to build up a mighty armada for the transport of troops to the mainland to cast the Manchus from the Dragon Throne. The spirit of Cheng Chen-kung had not died with him but had been kept alive in the society that his followers had formed, the Triad Society, known as 'San Ho Hui' and at other times as the 'Hung' Society.
At Tainan in Formosa at the time of Sun's visit was a young man, a native-born Formosan, who possibly met and talked with him. His name was Lien Ya-tang, who was later, in his monumental "History of Taiwan", to record the long series of revolts by Chinese in Formosa against the officials sent from Peking in the years prior to the Japanese occupation. In 1721 and again in 1785 there were major revolts against those Manchu officials. Even to-day, the native-born Chinese in Formosa observe the 19th day of the third moon as the "Day of Light" and no house is without its lantern It was on this day of this month in 1368 that the Ming or Brilliant Dynasty was established. It was not surprising, then, that the spirit of Formosa took possession of Sun Yat-sen. Chia Luen-lo has immortalised this in his "Life of Sun Yat-sen in a drawing, showing Sun standing on the rocks of the coast near Tainan with binoculars in his hands and looking, across the waters of the Formosan Strait, to the China mainland.
It is not necessary for our present purpose to detail the history of the Revolution and the early years of the Republic except to note that, at the time of Sun's death in 1925, the objectives for which he had striven had not been realised.
What was the British attitude to Sun Yat-sen and the revolution? How did London view the infant Chinese republic that had been set up? Official opinion in London, at that time, was being moulded largely by two men, Dr. Morrison, the Peking correspondent of the 'Times', and Timothy Richard, known throughout China as 'Li Ti-mo-tai' because of reputation in Chinese official and scholastic circles. Dr. Morrison had denounced Sun Yat-sen as "the main obstacle to Chinese progress" but later he regretted that attitude and before his death admitted that "if I had appreciated the character of Sun Yat-sen years ago 'as I do now, the history of China could have been different", an indication that Morrison knew just the extent to which he had made official opinion in London. Timothy Richard believed that reform rather than revolution was China's necessity. Like many other missionaries in China at that time, he saw China's salvation in a reform movement, based on the adoption of Western ideas. The great Viceroy, Chang Chih-tung in his book "Learn" had expounded such ideas, whilst K'ang Yu-wei suggested even more radical methods but nevertheless of a reform nature. Before leaving China for London in 1896, Richard had been informed by Peking authorities that Sun Yat-sen was "a dangerous man, with strange ideas on the question of government in China" and it had been added that "his actions might prejudice the cause of Christian missions unless he was restrained". Sun, of course, was a Christian. To Timothy Richard, with his wide knowledge of Chinese history, such a warning must have been disturbing. Both Li Hung Chang and Tseng Kuo-fan had blamed Christianity for the T'ai P'ing outbreak. Peking might regard Sun as another Hung. Timothy Richard attempted to persuade Sun that reform rather than revolution was the answer to the China problem and when he met Sun in London he pursued the subject vigorously. This missionary-scholar had little difficulty in getting the ear of official London with the result that Morrison's estimate of Sun was confirmed. Lionel Curtis, in his "The Capital Question of China" remarks that "In 1911, when news reached Sun in London that the dynasty had fallen, he had tried to secure British assistance before leaving for China, but had met with little but chilling politeness. Officials, merchants and journalists regarded the man as a futile visionary and, as events were to show, British money was staked on Yuan Shih-kai". Sir Francis Low, formerly of the British Foreign Office, has recently written that "Had the Western Powers taken more interest in Sun Yat-sen's movement and had they responded to his appeals for help, the growth of nationalism in China might have followed a different course".
In 1923 Sun Yat-sen turned to Russia. Why? This is a most important question in view of what has since taken place. What circumstance or set of circumstances forced Sun to declare "Our faces are turned towards Russia and no longer will we look to the Western Powers". He was not thinking of Communism for he never subscribed to that creed and to the last maintained that Communism would never be suited to Chinese conditions. Why, then, did he turn to Russia?
It has generally been accepted that the reason lay in the refusal first by Britain and later by America to grant economic and financial assistance to the infant republic and afford it that recognition of equality that was one of the basic concepts of Sun's philosophy. But recently, this has been challenged by Sir John Pratt, who after serving as a Consular official in China became adviser on the Far East to the British Foreign Office. He maintains that this explanation is just a myth and nothing else. In his "War and Politics in China" he states:
'It will hardly be contended even by the most ardent critic of his country that England and America should have plunged into these Chinese civil wars and helped one of the factions, whose principles happened to meet with their approval, to overthrow the recognised government at Peking. It is perfectly true that Sun was always brooding about alliances and that vagueness in theory and practice was his outstanding characteristic. He had many conversations with British officials and asked for assistance in obtaining foreign experts for various branches of the Canton administration. Every effort was made to comply with the requests for this was the sort of assistance that might reasonably and properly be extended to a regional government, such as Sun's, but owing to Sun's vagueness nothing ever came of it'.
He then refers to what he calls "one of the many myths that have sprung up like weeds in modern Chinese history". "Sun Yat-sen, so the story goes," he continues, "asked England and America to help him establish democratic institutions in China and it was only when they refused, that he turned, in despair, to Soviet Russia".
But what are the facts? Why did Sun turn to Soviet Russia? Yuan Shih-kai had died in 1916. Once his restraining hand had gone, warlords, who had been previously military governors, sprang up all over the country. Of these, the two that concern us in this present study were Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu.
In 1917, the Governments in Peking and Canton had agreed to divide between them the surplus revenue from the customs in the proportion of 86.3 for Peking and the remaining 13.7 for Canton. In 1920 when Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu joined forces and took over control of Peking, one of their first acts was to seize the customs revenue percentage due to Canton and hold it as security for the domestic loan they proposed to float. In 1922, Sun Yat-sen planned his northern campaign to destroy these warlords and unify the country. He had long believed that it was not possible for China to be divided and prosper. Earlier he had resigned in favour of Yuan Shih-kai because he had regarded him as the one man who could bring in the north and thus unify China. That was in 1912. It seemed to Sun that unity was as far removed as ever, so, in 1922, he led his forces to the central plains as the first stage of his advance on Peking. Then came the news that one of his Generals who had remained in Canton, Ch'en Ch'iung-ming had seized the opportunity to take over control. He forced the Nationalists out of Canton and set himself up as a kind of southern warlord. Meanwhile, Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu had fallen out, with Ghang Tso-lin retiring to Manchuria, and leaving Wu P'ei-fu in complete control. This encouraged him to extend his domain to the Yang-tse Valley region. It seemed that he was soon to have control of the greater part of the country. In 1923 the Nationalists succeeded in returning to Canton and driving out Ch'en Ch'iung-ming and Sun immediately began to consolidate his party in the south. But he had to face one great problem. He needed finance and his means of securing it were confined to Canton, whose people were already taxed to the limit. Accordingly, Sun applied to the Diplomatic Body in Peking, requesting that the Inspector-General of Customs be instructed to remit to Canton the percentage of customs revenue due under the 1917 agreement. It seems that this request was not treated seriously. He renewed it only to be informed that Peking alone, that was Wu P'ei-fu, could deal with it. He refused the request and thereupon Sun threatened to take over the Customs House in Canton. An international fleet moved in to prevent the threat being carried out.
Why was this action taken? The Government in Canton was acting in strict accordance with its legal rights in demanding its share of the Customs revenue. Chinese historians have maintained that Britain was the prime mover against Sun Yat-sen as she was determined that all available funds should go to Wu P'ei-fu, who had granted Britain special privileges in the Yang-tse Valley and Shanghai. It is interesting to note that the Communist leader Mao Tse-tung has also stated that "Wu P'ei-fu was supported by British imperialism". The non-Communist historian, Chia Luen-lo, in h is "Life of Sun Yat-sen" deals, at some length, with this incident and offers this explanation of Britain's championship of Wu P'ei-fu as against Sun Yat-sen:
'The British were particularly sensitive about their de facto spheres of influence in South China and they feared that a revolutionary government advocating the abolition of the unequal treaties, if allowed to be firmly established in Canton, would be prejudicial and even detrimental to their economic and political position".
However, in his despair, and seeing China divided among warlords, each of whom he believed to be backed by a foreign Power, seeking to serve its own ends, Sun Yat-sen turned to Russia. He was forced to the conclusion that from Russia alone was there any hope of securing that aid that China so badly needed.
(c) The third crisis, which culminated in the setting-up of the Communist regime in Peking and the establishment of the Nationalist Government in Taipei in 1949 now claims our attention. It is not necessary to detail the events covering the years from the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 till 1949. Perhaps the best summing-up of China and her problems during those tragic years is that of Professor Buss of Stanford:
'China was unfortunate in encountering its Renaissance, its Reformation, its Industrial Revolution, and its French Revolution at once; and in the midst of it all, it was engulfed by foreign invasion. Neither the Kuomintang nor any other regime, in these circumstances, could have guided its revolution into constructive channels and at the same time, girded itself to meet the invader from across the Yellow Sea'.
He might, however, have added "and the Soviet intriguer and wrecker from across the Mongolian wastes".
What has been the official British attitude towards this latest China development?
In 1950 a Labour Government was in control in Britain and accorded the Peking Communist Government full recognition. A British diplomat was sent to Peking but the latter did not reciprocate for some time. It is not necessary here to suggest causes for this delay. It is interesting, however, to examine the reasons for the British recognition of the Peking Communist Government. We draw attention to three of these.
For some years, prior to 1950, an atmosphere, favourable to the Chinese Communists and against the Nationalists, had been created in London. Harrison Forman, Correspondent of the 'Times' had, in the tradition of Dr. Morrison, extolled the virtues of the Communists as 'agrarian reformers' and the Nationalists as 'fascist reactionaries'. Stuart Gelder, sent to China by 'The News Chronicle' had returned with a sheaf of Communist documents extolling the Communist programme and progress. In all, the Chinese Communists were portrayed as a Chinese opposite number of British Labour. But this was not confined to journalists. In 1945, Sir John Pratt, who bad been Far Eastern adviser to the Foreign Office published some most remarkable but unfounded views on China. Here is a brief extract from his statement:
'Communism in China is a typical product of the Chinese soil - a Chinese plant that was shown with Soviet seed…. A question that that is causing great anxiety is whether, when the pressure of external aggression is removed, the present arrangements will break down and China fall a prey once more to civil war. The ideological differences which divide the Communists and the Kuomintang are not wide enough to cause any such catastrophe. It is not a problem of communism at all, for communism has faded out in Russia and never really existed in China'.
A remarkable statement indeed and by one who, for years, had been mainly responsible for British policy in China, quite a part from its open contradiction! However, journalist and official combined to create the atmosphere that made it easy for the Labour Party to take a course that appealed to it for quite another reason, namely, Labour's own declared social and economic policy.
Added to these was the customary British practice of supporting those in control or who appeared to be in control, as, in this manner, the facilities of trade appear to be likely of success. Hence the phrase, which was repeated so often at the time, that "It is to be hoped that this action will do much to protect British interests in China". If there were any qualms of conscience at the time, they were allayed by the expressed hope that "the Communist regime in China will become liberalised", although no definition of a liberalised communism was offered.
This recognition of the Peking Government, however, had also to take note of Free China and the Government in Taipei. First, it suggested that the off-shore islands of Kinmen and the Matsus should be ceded to Communist China. Later, it was urged that Formosa itself should be handed over. Now the policy of the Labour Party, in opposition, is that there should be held a plebescite to enable the native-born people of Formosa to decide their own future.
In 1955 the Conservatives came to power in Britain. Since then, little has been said as to the future of Formosa, but there is a strong feeling in favour of the plebescite idea, with emphasis on the transfer of the off-shore islands to Communist China. The Conservatives, however, possibly in view of the firm United States stand, have not pressed these things, but have concentrated on trade with both Communist China and Free China. In recent months, Britain has intensified her campaign for increased trade with Communist China. Groups of businessmen have been there, also representatives of the Board of Trade. Incidentally, Formosa has also been visited by a Board of Trade delegation.
In seeking to discover just what the British policy is we must take note of the conditions prevailing in Communist China at the time Britain decided to increase her trade with that country, contrary to the views of Australia and the United States. While the Commons were deciding, practically unanimously, on this increased trade campaign, reports were reaching London that half the factories and industrial plants in Shanghai were idle for want of machinery and raw materials, that the Minister of Commerce had been sacked because the living costs had risen to as high as 100 per cent in parts of China, that Communist officials had been stationed in the leading banks to dissuade people from withdrawing their money, and that Peking had announced that it would not be possible for China to discharge her commitments to Russia during 1957 owing to the economic state of the country. Meanwhile, observers in Hongkong were stating that this crisis could lead to complete economic disintegration. Such was the position in China at the time Britain decided on an intense trade campaign there.
2. Having reviewed British official actions during these three crises over the past century, we arrive at the question: Are there any constant features in these actions, which can be regarded as forming a definite and consistent policy?
Several facts cannot have escaped notice. For instance, on each occasion, China has been divided between imperialists and the forces of freedom. On each of these, Britain has taken the side of the former. But not because Britain favoured the imperialists as such. Indeed, during 1856-1860 during the T'ai P'ing rebellion, there was a strange ironic situation, when Britain was fighting both sides in China. In one part of the country she was assisting the Imperialists against the T'ai P'ings and in another part fighting the Imperialists. The explanation of this seems to have been that they hoped for better trade facilities from the Imperialists but, at the same time, resented their actions.
Out of it all, three conclusions can be drawn, as follows:
(a) Britain was anxious for peace to be secured in China.
(b) Britain was interested, primarily, in trade in China.
(c) Britain was not interested in the conditions of the people.
Britain's China Policy, then, can be stated thus: A state of peace, in which British trading interests could best be served, without any regard for the conditions of the Chinese people.
3. We pass, now, from the role of the historian to that of the observer. I think it was Abraham Lincoln who once said that "we cannot escape history", but the real value of the study of history must surely be that it enables us to sec the mistakes of the past and fashion our future accordingly.
(a) My first observation is that British policy, in the past, has failed to realise that the China problem is basically a human problem. Britain failed to see the human side of the T'ai P'ing struggle just as she ignored the human aspect of Sun Yat-sen's lifelong campaign. To-day, she shuts her eyes to the unspeakable conditions, under which the goods she receives from Communist China are produced, conditions which would never be tolerated in Britain by any political party.
It is argued that it is no concern of one trading country what conditions exist in another with which it does business. This was the attitude adopted in the past by most countries but to-day, when adherence has been pledged to the Charter of Human Rights, this position is no longer tenable, especially when it is a known fact that Communist China is one vast slave camp, though it be disguised under such epithets as "reform through labour" camps and the like. Instead of allowing this system, which in based on the denial of human rights to destroy itself, Britain prefers to pump new economic life into it, thus helping to perpetuate human slavery.
It will be agreed that the fundamental issue in world affairs, at the moment, is that of human freedom, based on the recognition of the dignity of the individual. All other antagonisms between East and West stem from the divergence of view on this basic question. If all governments were agreed on this right of the individual to freedom, expressed in the phrase "the consent of the governed", then most other problems would be much easier of solution. In short, the world problem is a human problem and to disregard it in the interest of trade or anything else is simply to prolong the world agony.
British newspapers devote long articles to the material progress in Communist China, the building of factories, construction of roads and railways etc. But slaves can do all these things. In themselves, these things do not constitute civilisation or human progress. Rarely is there any mention, in these articles, of the Chinese people who build the roads and the railways. Their conditions are ignored. It is this utter and complete disregard of the human element that has been and still is a conspicuous element in British policy towards China. If, on the other hand, Britain were interested in the human progress of the Chinese people, she would, at least, accord moral encouragement to Free China, whose economic progress is the result of the endeavours and toil of free men and women.
(b) Second observation is that this failure to recognise the human aspect of the China problem over the past century, and the persistent emphasis on trade to the exclusion of the humanities, contributed to the creation of that atmosphere that made Communism in China possible. In other words, British policy in China has been in keeping with the known mechanics of Marxism. One missionary, at the time of the T'ai P'ings expressed the opinion that had it not been for the suppression of the T'ai P'ings, China might have become a Christian country in a generation. That mayor may not be so, but it cannot be denied that the land problem, the source of much of China's troubles, would probably have been solved. Little would have remained for Communists, at a later date, to exploit. Had Britain and of course some other Western Powers, understood the human basis of the Sun Yat-sen crusade and cared less for their special privileges in China, Russia might never have got a footing in China. And if Britain had not led the way recently in pumping new economic life into the Chinese Communist system, then it could deteriorate into disintegration and thus remove the one potential threat to South East Asia and ultimately to the entire world.
(c) My third and final observation is that the present British emphasis on trade to the exclusion of all other considerations and that of human rights especially, helps to make Communist expansion in South East Asia easier. Of course, it is often repeated that recognition of the Peking Government and trade with Communist China do not mean approval of the Peking regime. The people of Britain know this. They understand the difference clearly. But not so the people of China or indeed those of South East Asia. They interpret recognition as approval and trading as acquiescence. Indeed, this latter is not confined to the peoples of South East Asia for politicians of both parties in Britain seem now to have reached the conclusion that China is irrevocably lost to Communism. Needless to say, this is the worst of heresies.
Let me give you, briefly, two recent reports from South East Asia. The ex-Prime Minister of Thailand, Field-Marshal Songgram made this statement in September:
'Communists are not busier here because of anything in Siam but because of world trends such as increased trade with Communist China and Russia. Some people here would naturally like to follow Britain's example. They wonder if the British can trade with China, why the Siamese cannot. China listens to the howls of our people about this and, in turn, puts on more pressure. 'It is through trade and commerce more than anything else that Communism is increasing. One of our largest markets is Hongkong, which is a sort of Grand Central Station for the Communists. They don't stop there but come right through to Siam'.
The other report comes from Indonesia, where in the regional elections in Java, the Communists moved up from fourth to first place.
'Western observers attribute the Communists' rise from fourth to first place in 18 months to four principal factors. These are general political dissatisfaction, hard work, money, and President's tour with Marshal Voroshilov, the Russian President'.
This refers to Communist Russia but it emphasises that prestige to which I have been referring, the prestige which Britain has given to the Chinese Communists and how this is capitalised for the extension of Communism.
However, it would seem that the Australian Government is more alive to the danger than is Britain. Recently, in London, the Australian Minister of External Affairs expressed the view that Peking is the directing and driving force behind all Communist activities in South East Asia, a conclusion, with which, I would doubt that the British Government agrees.
Sections of the British press, however, have been drawing attention to the Communist threat to Hongkong. The 'Daily Telegraph' has directed attention to the Peking demand that its jurisdiction extends over all waters within 12 nautical miles of the coast; the 'Daily Express' has published a cable from its Hongkong correspondent to the effect that "The Red Chinese plan to try to overwhelm Hongkong with a 24-hour blitzkrieg"; and the 'Observer' has published a despatch from its Hongkong correspondent, stating that "It is officially known here that Communist China has, on paper, a plan to capture Hongkong in 24 hours."
One final word. In my opening remarks, it was suggested that the future of civilisation may be determined, to a large extent, by the outcome of this China problem. One thing is certain. Communist China is developing a force, it might be called a spiritual force, which will prove more powerful, yes, and more destructive than any bomb. She needs a generation of peace for this construction. When it is complete in 20 years, then, civilisation will face its most critical period. I refer to that Chinese Communist Conscience, which the subtle education system of Communist China is now fashioning. Unless measures are taken within this period to defeat the plans of Peking, then, one might well fear for the future of South East Asia, for the holding of Australia, and finally for the world at large.